remedies against directors for breach of duties. If the courts were to take into account these distinctive considerations pertaining to company law, they would be very cautious in allowing the defendant's illegality defence to succeed, as that defence might not be firmly justified by the policy-the consistency rationale-that underlie its existence.
Part I explains the consistency rationale as that was the primary rationale underlying the illegality defence deployed by the courts in Moore Stephens and Safeway in which the claimant was a company. The secondary rationale which was briefly stated in Moore Stephens is that the claimant should not profit from its wrongdoing 13 . And although one judge in Safeway said that denying the company's claim would achieve deterrent effect 14 , Longmore LJ who gave the leading judgment (and with whom Lloyd LJ agreed) deployed consistency as the sole policy rationale underlying the illegality defence in his judgment.
Part II explains the first of the three distinctive considerations pertaining to company law 15 -corporate attribution and separate legal personality-which should be carefully borne in mind by the courts when defendants plead the illegality defence in order to strike-out claims brought by companies seeking to enforce duties owed to them by the defendants who are directors and officers as well as third parties. It will be argued that in applying the consistency rationale to cases involving companies as claimants, the court in Moore Stephens and Safeway failed to appreciate the doctrinal feature of corporate attribution; the acts of the delinquent director(s) 12 Companies Act 2006, section 178. 15 It should be emphasized that these three considerations, although distinctive to company law, are not exhaustive or exclusive. There are other distinctive considerations relating to company law.
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were erroneously attributed to the claimant company in order to defeat an admitted breach of duty by them, a breach that had caused the company to incur liabilities that it would not otherwise have occurred. And in relation to separate legal personality, it will be argued that by treating the directors and employees (in the case of Safeway) and the sole director and shareholder (in the case of Moore Stephens) as though they were the company itself who were seeking to challenge the illegality defence, the court contravened the long established principle that although a company is an artificial entity and can only act through natural persons, it is to be treated as a legal personality separate and distinct from its directors and shareholders.
Part III explains the second distinctive consideration pertaining to company law --corporate objectives. It will be argued that courts should take into account the enlightened shareholder model and stakeholder theory of corporate objective in determining whether the illegality defence should be allowed to defeat a company's claim. It will be argued that the failure to do so will lead to adverse consequences for the shareholders and the stakeholders (especially the creditors).
Part IV explains the final distinctive consideration, the Companies Act 2006. It will be argued that since the prevention of inconsistency between the different aspects of law is a central policy rationale underlying the illegality defence, courts should consider whether barring a company from recovering damages, which is a consequence of the sentence imposed upon it for its criminal or quasi criminal act, will render the law inconsistent, insofar as it does not sit well with several provisions in the Act which provide for civil remedies for a company when it is subject to sanctions as a result of its commission of certain criminal offences. "…to allow recovery in these cases would be to allow recovery for what is illegal. It would put the courts in the position of saying that the same conduct is both legal, in the sense of being capable of rectification by the court, and illegal. It would, in short, introduce an inconsistency in the law. It is particularly important in this context that we bear in mind that the law must aspire to be a unified institution, the parts of which -contract, tort, the criminal law -must be in essential harmony. For the courts to punish conduct with the one hand while rewarding it with the other, would be to 'create an intolerable fissure in the law's conceptually seamless web… We thus see that the concern, put at its most fundamental, is with the integrity of the legal system." 6 against certain banks. S&R and Mr Stojevic were successfully sued for deceit by one of the banks. S&R alleged that the auditors breached their duty of care of care and skill by failing to detect the fraud and this prolonged the company's losses. The auditors accepted that they were in breach of their duty and conceded that but for their breach, the fraud would have been detected earlier. The liquidator sought to recover from the auditors the losses caused by the extension of the period of fraud. The auditors raised the illegality defence and argued that the company's claim should be struck out because the company had to rely on its own illegal conduct in order to sue the auditors. The majority held that the fraud of the directing mind and will, Mr Stojevic, was to be attributed to the company and since Mr Stojevic's fraud was the company's fraud, the company was barred from recovering compensation for the consequences of its own illegality.
I: THE CONSISTENCY RATIONALE
In Safeway, the claimant company was liable to pay a hefty penalty (which could be more than £16 million) because it breached section 2(1) of the Competition Act which prohibited pricefixing. The claimant alleged that the defendants (comprising the directors and employees) breached their contract and/or fiduciary duties by participating in the prohibited price-fixing initiatives. The claimant sued the defendants by seeking an indemnity for the penalty. The defendants argued that the claimant's suit should be struck out on the basis of the illegality defence because the claimant was seeking to recover a benefit (the indemnity) from the unlawful act. The court struck out the company's claim. It was held that to allow the company under the civil law to recover from the defendants the penalty imposed on it by the criminal law would be inconsistent with the latter. Longmore LJ explained and applied the consistency rationale in the following terms:
7 "The rationale of the maxim is the need for the criminal courts and the civil courts to speak with a consistent voice. It would be inconsistent for a claimant to be criminally and personally liable (or liable to pay penalties to a regulator such as the OFT) but for the same claimant to say to a civil court that he is not personally answerable for that conduct."
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II. CORPORATE ATTRIBUTION AND SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY
A. Corporate Attribution
It is trite law that the legal identity of a company is separate from its directors and shareholders.
A company, once legally incorporated, "must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself." Stephens was ascribed to the company in order to hold the company liable for the tort of deceit to the banks), it does not follow that the acts of those agents should also be attributed to the company in order to defeat, on the basis of the illegality defence, the company's claim against its 21 [2010] EWCA Civ 1472 at para 16. agents, or third parties, for breach of duties. 23 Two examples suffice for now to illustrate this point. By allowing the defendants' illegality defence to succeed, the court in Safeway was in effect attributing to the company the acts of its directors and employees and in Moore Stephens, the acts of its sole director, in order to defeat an admitted breach of duty by them, a breach that had caused the company to incur liabilities that it would not otherwise have occurred.
In Safeway, the defendant directors and employees successfully pleaded the illegality defence to preclude the company's claim against them for breach of duty under contract and tort. The company did so in order to recover from the defendants the penalty imposed upon it as a result of breaching the Competition Act 1998. The breach was caused by the defendants' participation in the illegal price-fixing initiatives. The Court of Appeal held that the illegality defence barred the company from recovering the penalty from the very directors and employees whose conduct had caused the company to incur liability. This is because, according to Longmore LJ (with whom Lloyd LJ agreed), to allow the company's claim would create an inconsistency between the criminal law (under which the company was liable to pay the penalty) and civil law (under which the company was suing to recover the penalty). 24 But it can be argued that there is no inconsistency in the law to allow the company's claim. Or at the very least, the different corporate attribution issue that arises from criminal law as compared to civil law has to be carefully considered when courts seek to justify the application of the illegality defence on the basis of avoiding inconsistency. Under the criminal law, the wrongful acts of the company's agents are rightfully attributed to the company in order to make the company liable for breaching the rule (for example, the statute) in question. Under the civil law, however, when the court strikes out a company's claim on the basis of the defendants' illegality defence, the court is in effect attributing the wrongful acts of the defendants to the company in order to defeat its claim against them for breach of duties that they owe to it. But such an attribution is unjustified. Under the criminal law, in order to make the company liable, certain acts of its agents have to be attributed to the company. But when a company sues the defendants under the civil law to recover from them a penalty imposed upon it which is caused by the defendants' illegality, the issue, unlike under the criminal law, is not which acts of which agents should count as the company's acts for the purpose of fixing liability on the company. On the contrary, the issue is whether the acts of its agents should be attributed to the company in order to defeat its claim against them for breach of duties. But the court in Safeway failed to justify such an attribution on the basis of precedent or policy.
In Moore Stephens, the House of Lords held three to two that the defendant auditors succeeded in invoking the illegality defence and thus the insolvent company, acting through its liquidator, was barred from suing them for breach of duty of care under contract and tort for failing to detect the fraud perpetuated against the banks by the company's sole director and shareholder. This was despite the auditors' admission that they were in breach: they conceded that but for their breach, the fraud would have been detected earlier and thus, the losses caused by the extension of the period of fraud could have been prevented.
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Although two of the three Law Lords in the majority mentioned the consistency rationale with approval, they paid lip service to it. It is submitted that there is no inconsistency between the criminal law and civil law as the company was not suing to recover for damages caused by a criminal sentence because there was no such sentence in the first place. 25 On the contrary, the company was merely seeking to recover from the auditors the damages that were awarded, in a civil action, to the banks (which were its creditors) against the company and the delinquent director as result of the fraud perpetrated on the banks by that director. the law "prevents a company being treated as party to a fraud committed by its officers "on" or "against" the company, at least in the context of claims by the company for redress for offences committed against the company." 29 
It is submitted that the reasoning in Moore Stephens
His
Lordship held that in cases involving a company seeking recourse from persons who owe duties and have committed wrongs towards it, such situations "compel by their nature a separation of the interests and states of mind of the company and those owing it duties." 30 However, despite 25 In any event, even if the company in Moore Stephens were suing under the civil law to recover damages imposed by a criminal sentence, the court should carefully consider the different attribution issue that arises from the criminal law as compared to the civil law when it purported to justify the application of the illegality defence on the basis of the consistency rationale. Lord Mance's and Lord Scott's vigorous dissent, the majority in Moore Stephens attributed the fraud of the sole director and shareholder to the company and held that the illegality defence precluded the company's claim. Likewise, the court in Safeway attributed the illegal acts of the defendants to the company and struck out the company's claim. 31 
B. Separate Legal Personality
By barring the company from suing the defendant directors and auditors for breach of duties, the court in Safeway and Moore Stephens was ignoring or bypassing the separate legal personality of the company and treating the directors and employees (in the case of Safeway) and the sole director and shareholder (in the case of Moore Stephens) as though they were the company itself who were seeking to challenge the illegality defence. But the company is a legal persona in its own right. Although it is an artificial entity and can only act through natural persons, it is to be treated as a legal personality separate and distinct from its directors and members. This is a fundamental principle of company law. The separate legal personality of the company in Safeway and Moore Stephens has to be respected because the directors' illegality in those cases constituted a breach of duty that they owed to the company. The separate legal personality has to be recognized because neither Safeway nor Moore Stephens involved a situation in which all of the shareholders in a solvent company concur in committing the company to some decision within its memorandum of association. Where a company seeks compensation for the penalty caused by the directors' wrongdoing by suing a director for breach of duties, the company is not seeking to shift its legal responsibility to the director and seeking to evade consequences of its conduct. On the contrary, to allow the company's claim would only mean holding a director responsible and in doing so, a company is a separate legal personality enforcing duties owed to it by the director. The company in Safeway was invoking the very well-established common law and statutory 33 remedies that are available to it for breach of directors' duties, which are neither precluded nor supplanted by the Competition Act 1998.
34
It was not asking the court to act inconsistently with the law as the company and directors are separate legal personalities. The company was merely enforcing, and not seeking to profit from but to obtain compensation for, breach of the duties which the defendants owed to it.
Further, preventing the company from enforcing the breach of duties committed by the directors will produce a startling result: the fraudulent or negligent directors can commit the company to serious illegality 35 and then escape liability with impunity, however egregious the damage they inflict on the company and however grave the losses that might subsequently be caused to the innocent shareholders during solvency and innocent stakeholders (such as employees, suppliers and especially creditors) during insolvency, if the company were to plead or rely on this illegality to establish its claim.
36
This is all the more unsatisfactory since any damages that the company in Ultimately, it is the owners of the company who will bear the adverse consequences when a solvent company performs badly or incurs certain serious liabilities and it is the creditors who will (among other stakeholders) bear the adverse consequences when a company is insolvent. For example, as the company in Safeway was precluded from recovering from the defendants the penalty imposed upon it which could exceed £16 million, it had to be met out of the company and hence the members' funds. And by barring the company's claim in Moore Stephens, the liquidator was prevented from recovering damages, in an amount that exceeded US$94 million, for the benefit of the company's creditors (which were the banks defrauded by the delinquent director).
Thus, under the enlightened shareholder model, by barring a solvent company's claim on the basis of the illegality defence, a court fails to protect the shareholders for whose interests the company is run and since directors owe duties to the company for the sake of the shareholders whose interests the company exists to protect and advance, depriving the company its wellestablished right under common law to enforce the duties owed to it by directors is disproportionate to the harmful consequences to be borne by the company and ultimately the shareholders, which harm was caused by the illegal conduct of the directors in the first place, and who in the very first place were under a duty not to commit such illegality and cause harmful consequences. And under the stakeholder theory, barring an insolvent company's claim on the ground of illegality defence is particularly unjust because the interests of the stakeholders (i.e. employees, suppliers and especially creditors) will be critically jeopardized.
Finally, where a company sues a third party (such as auditors in the case of Moore Stephens), the third party will not necessarily be liable for an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class because the company is only suing to recover for its losses (which are for the benefit of the creditors); the company is not suing to recover any personal losses suffered by any particular stakeholder. 41 The auditors' duty of care is owed to the company for the benefit of the creditors, and not to the individual creditor or stakeholder.
IV. THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 (THE "ACT")
Although the prevention of inconsistency, or the pursuit of harmony 42 , between the different aspects or branches of law is a central policy rationale underlying the illegality defence, the case law is not consistent with several provisions in the Act which provide for civil remedies for a company when it is subject to sanctions as a result of its commission of certain criminal offences. These civil remedies are targeted at the directors and others, the purpose of which is to ameliorate the consequences of those criminal sanctions on the company. It is suggested that one reason for this is that although there are justifications as to why the company should be primarily liable if it breaches an obligation under the Act, the breach will also unfairly cause detriment to the company's shareholders (and presumably other stakeholders). Conviction may lead to a fine and which have to be drawn from the company and hence shareholders' funds. The innocent shareholders will be penalized twice, once by the company's failure to comply with its obligations under the Act, the result of which may have already caused serious losses to the shareholders and other stakeholders, and the second time by the fine. Examples of a civil remedy available to a company include firstly, a company can sue the delinquent directors (for damages for conspiracy, for example) despite being a party to a transaction that infringes the criminal prohibition against financial assistance under section 678. 43 Secondly, under section 463(2), a company can make a claim against directors for compensation for any loss it suffers as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the directors' report. Thus, by categorically barring the company's civil claim against the directors and employees for conspiracy, breach of duties and negligence, the reasoning and result in Safeway are inconsistent with the spirit of those provisions in the Act which, firstly, specifically provide for civil remedies for the company against directors and others, and secondly, do not preclude the company from enforcing duties owed to it by directors and officers, despite criminal sanctions being imposed on the company.
Finally, a key policy justification underlying the Act for not imposing criminal sanctions on directors who are in breach of their duties is that it would be inappropriate for public authorities to intrude on the company's decision making process concerning how directors' duties should be enforced as that is a civil domestic matter best left to the discretion of the company. sanctions from the delinquent directors, and if imposing criminal sanctions on the delinquent directors will achieve the same effect as penalising the company.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that courts should carefully bear in mind the distinctive considerations pertaining to company law whenever defendants invoke the illegality defence in order to defeat the claims brought by companies seeking to enforce duties owed to them. Failure to do so will lead to a distorted application of the consistency rationale underlying the illegality defence. 
